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INTRODUCTION
Paul Sedore defrauded the Internal Revenue Service. Using
names and social security numbers obtained from preparing
legitimate tax returns for his friends while incarcerated, Sedore
submitted false tax returns and received about $50,000 from the
IRS.' Indicted by a federal grand jury on four counts, Sedore pled
guilty to two of them, conspiracy to defraud the IRS and identity
theft.2 Based only on what Sedore admitted in his guilty plea and
his criminal history, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines would have
recommended a sentence of twelve to eighteen months in prison.3
But the sentencing judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that Sedore used a special skill to facilitate his offense, obstructed
justice, and harmed between 50 and 250 victims.4 Based on those
judge-found facts, which the defendant did not admit and which the
jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt, the Guidelines advised
a range of 84 to 105 months.5 The court sentenced Sedore to 84
months.6
Consider another scenario. A hypothetical judge sentences an-
other criminal, convicted of the same offenses as Sedore, with the
same criminal history. This judge sentences this hypothetical
criminal to 84 months in prison without finding any additional facts.
The court of appeals would likely reverse this hypothetical sentence.
Why? Because the judge did not follow the Guidelines, and, hence,
the sentence was not "reasonable." This is hardly the "advisory"
system that the Supreme Court imagines it is.
In United States v. Booker,7 the Supreme Court found that the
mandatory Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial because they necessarily increased the maximum available
sentence based on facts found by the judge, not the jury, by a
1. United States v. Sedore, 512 F.3d 819, 821 (6th Cir. 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 829 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 821 (majority opinion).
5. Id. at 821-22.
6. Id. at 821.
7. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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preponderance of the evidence.8 Under the mandatory Guidelines,
judges found extra facts at sentencing, such as acquitted conduct,
uncharged conduct, or aggravating or mitigating factors of the crime
itself.9 Those facts, never presented to a jury, mechanically in-
creased the defendant's sentence.10 Therefore, the mandatory
Guidelines violated the right to be tried by a jury.
Booker was supposed to correct this constitutional flaw.
Rather than preserve the mandatory Guidelines and require the
Government to prove each fact beyond a reasonable doubt to the
jury, the Court rendered the Guidelines advisory and instructed the
appellate courts to review for "unreasonableness."" The meaning
and appropriate boundaries of appellate reasonableness review gave
rise to "a confusing battle royale over a wide array of modern federal
sentencing laws and practices."' At the heart of this battle is the
tension between constitutional constraints, advisory Guidelines, and
the circuits' efforts to impose sentencing uniformity.
Booker's inherent conflicts allowed the circuits to try to resurrect
the mandatory Guidelines, prompting the Supreme Court to revisit
Booker twice in the last year, in Rita v. United States" and Gall v.
United States.4 In those cases, the Court attempted, with little
success, to rein in the chief tools that the circuits use to enforce the
Guidelines: the presumption of reasonableness and proportionality
review. In Rita, the Court allowed circuits to apply a presumption
of reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentences and to require
from trial courts merely an abrupt, conclusory explanation of
within-Guidelines sentences. 5 In Gall, the Court prohibited the
most egregious de novo reviews of sentences outside the Guidelines
range, but effectively, and unfortunately, permitted proportionality
review to continue.16
8. Id. at 226.
9. Id. at 233-37.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 260-61.
12. Douglas A. Berman, Rita, Reasoned Sentencing, and Resistance to Change, 85 DENV.
U. L. REv. 7, 8 (2007).
13. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
14. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
15. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2462-63.
16. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597-98.
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The current system clearly encourages federal district courts to
obey the Sentencing Guidelines, and strongly discourages straying
from them. Nonetheless, the Court persists in the fiction that the
Guidelines are "advisory." Instead of chipping away at reasonable-
ness review term-by-term, the Court should impose a clear, consti-
tutional solution. In order to bring reasonableness review into
compliance with the Sixth Amendment, the Court should allow
appellate courts to review sentencing decisions only for procedural
correctness, and require uniform explanations from the district
courts as to whether the sentence falls within or outside the
Guidelines range.
Part I of this Note reviews the history of the Sentencing Guide-
lines, the legal developments before Booker, Booker's tentative
solution, and the lower courts' reaction to Booker. Part II examines
the Supreme Court's recent opinions in Rita and Gall and argues
that these ambiguous decisions only perpetuated the Guidelines'
Sixth Amendment violations. Part III separates and analyzes the
three tools that appellate courts use to enforce the Guidelines,
namely: the presumption of reasonableness, the double standard of
procedural reasonableness, and proportionality review. This Part
demonstrates how each tool contributes to the unconstitutionality
of the current Guidelines regime. Part IV argues that all three tools
together defeat the advisory nature of the Guidelines and violate the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Part V proposes a two-part
solution: (1) prohibiting substantive reasonableness review and (2)
requiring uniform explanations for sentences both within and
outside the Guidelines range. This Part also considers objections to
that solution. Uniform, procedural appellate review would end the
illusion that the Guidelines are advisory and initiate a constitu-
tional federal sentencing regime.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Sentencing Reform Act
The Sentencing Guidelines began with the 1984 Sentencing
Reform Act (SRA), originally conceived to curtail wide disparities in
20081
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sentences for similar crimes. 7 The SRA established the United
States Sentencing Commission and directed the Commission to
formulate the Sentencing Guidelines according to the Act's ambigu-
ous"8 directives. 9 The Commission mostly based the Sentencing
Guidelines on sentences of federal defendants in 1985.20 To these
existing sentencing practices, the Commission added a level of
severity "to correct the fact that current federal sentences often did
not accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense. '21
The SRA stripped the sentencing judge of most of his discretion.
To calculate the correct sentence, the judge would find the relevant
facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Those facts mechanically
produced an offense level and a criminal history level. The judge
consulted a matrix with an axis for offense level and another axis
for criminal history.22 At the intersection of these levels on the
matrix, the judge located the corresponding range of months from
which he chose a sentence.23 Despite 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)'s mandate
to impose "a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,"24
17. Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 885 (1990).
18. KATE STITH & JoSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 51 (1998) (describing the SRA's directives as "ambiguous"). Contra Nagel,
supra note 17, at 905 ("Congress thus gave the Commission a specific mandate to determine
what combination of offense and offender characteristics should result in what sentence.").
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)-(n) (2006). The SRA instructed the Sentencing Commission to
"establish sentencing policies and practices" that: (1) meet the general purposes of sentencing
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); (2) "provide certainty and fairness," "avoido unwarranted
sentencing disparities ... while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized
sentences"; and (3) "reflect ... advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to
the criminal justice process." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2006). For the purposes of
sentencing in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), see infra note 24.
20. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 59.
21. Nagel, supra note 17, at 905 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(m)).
22. See, e.g., 2 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL 1207 (2006); Ed Hagen, Booker 101, 54 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS'
BULLETIN 6, Sept. 2006, at 2. For such fact-finding, judges mostly relied on the probation
officer's presentence report. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 86-89.
23. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 22, at 1207.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). This section requires that the court "impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary" in light of "the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant," the seriousness of the offense,
the need to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment, adequate deterrence,
protecting the public, rehabilitation, the kinds of sentences available, the appropriate
Guidelines range, the Sentencing Commission's policy statements, the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need for restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7)
272
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to fulfill the sentencing purposes that the statute establishes,
judges had very little leeway to sentence outside of the Guidelines
range. Judges could depart from the range by finding additional
aggravating or mitigating factors that the Guidelines listed as
grounds for departure.25 Although these grounds were not exhaus-
tive, the Commission prohibited the use of certain other factors as
bases for departure.26 The judge could depart for other reasons only
if the Commission had not "adequately" considered them. Under
the mandatory guidelines, district court judges effectively played a
procedural role in sentencing.
B. The Constitutional Problem with Mandatory Guidelines
Beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey28 in 2000, the revival of
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial threatened the mandatory
Guidelines. Some state and federal sentencing laws allowed judges,
not juries, to find specific facts regarding the crime, such as the use
of a deadly weapon or the amount of drugs possessed.29 Such laws
required judges, if they found any of these facts, to increase or
decrease the sentences by statutorily prescribed periods of time. In
Apprendi, the Court addressed New Jersey's sentencing laws, which
had allowed sentencing judges to find by a preponderance of the
evidence that a defendant was motivated by racial bias and enhance
his sentence.3" Such an enhancement violated Apprendi's right to a
"jury verdict based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt."31 The
Apprendi Court held, "Other than the fact of prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt."32 Because many sentencing regimes required
(2006).
25. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 22, § 5K2.1-2.24 (2006).
26. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 98.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006).
28. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). For an extended discussion of Apprendi, see Kyron Huigens,
Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387 (2002).
29. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 555-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 471. Apprendi pleaded guilty to three counts involving unlawful possession of
firearms and weaponry. Id. at 469-70.
31. Id. at 478.
32. Id. at 490.
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judges, rather than juries, to find facts that necessarily increased
the mandatory sentencing range, Apprendi created serious doubt
about their constitutionality.
C. "The Booker Mess"33
After Apprendi, both state and federal guidelines laws were of
questionable constitutionality. Typically, under a guidelines
sentencing system, when a sentencing judge finds a relevant fact,
guidelines laws mandate that the sentencing range increase or
decrease accordingly. In Blakely v. Washington,34 the Supreme
Court struck down the State of Washington's sentencing guidelines.
The Court concluded that the guidelines violated the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right because judge-found facts necessarily
increased Blakely's sentence.35 Blakely clearly implicated the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, given their similarity to those of
Washington.
United States v. Booker36 solved the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines' constitutional problems, at least in theory. In practice,
however, Sixth Amendment issues persist even after two additional
significant Supreme Court decisions regarding sentencing. Booker
consists of two very different majority opinions. The first, the merits
opinion, extended Apprendi to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and declared them unconstitutional; the second, the remedial
opinion, rendered the Guidelines advisory.3"
According to the Court's merits opinion, the mandatory Guide-
lines violated Freddie Booker's Sixth Amendment rights because
judge-found facts necessarily increased his sentence.38 The jury
convicted Booker of possession of 92.5 grams of crack cocaine.39
Under the Guidelines, that conviction alone merited a Guidelines
33. See Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENY. U. L. REV. 665 (2006).
34. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
35. Id. at 305.
36. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
37. Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens's majority
opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg joined
Justice Breyer's majority opinion.
38. Booker, 543 U.S. at 243-44.
39. Id. at 227.
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range of 210 to 262 months in prison.4 ° But when the judge found by
a preponderance of the evidence that Booker possessed an addi-
tional 566 grams, the Guidelines mandated a range of 360 months
to life.41 If the Guidelines had allowed the sentencing judge to
"exerciseo his discretion to select a specific sentence," they would
not have violated the Sixth Amendment because "the defendant has
no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems
relevant."42 But the judge lacked that discretion. When he found the
additional facts, the SRA and the Guidelines required the judge to
increase the Guidelines range. Therefore, Booker's sentence was
unconstitutional.43 Despite the merits majority's willingness to
affirm and apply Apprendi," it lacked the votes for a corresponding
remedy.45
The remedial majority provided a complex solution by rendering
the Guidelines advisory. The Court attempted to divine which
solution Congress would choose so that the SRA did not violate the
Sixth Amendment: requiring the jury to find each relevant fact for
the Guidelines calculation, or rendering the Guidelines advisory.46
Congress desired two features, the Court said: (1) a system in which
the judge, not the jury, considers the defendant and circumstances
of the crime; and (2) a system that diminishes unwarranted
sentencing disparity.47 Fearing that requiring the jury to find each
fact necessary for the Guidelines sentence "would destroy the
40. Id. The jury did not find Booker guilty of possessing the other 566 grams of crack.
United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 509 (7th Cir. 2004). Although there are serious
constitutional concerns regarding sentences enhanced for acquitted conduct, it was not at
issue in Booker. For more about acquitted conduct sentencing and the Sixth Amendment, see
James J. Bilsborrow, Note, Sentencing Acquitted Conduct to the Post-Booker Dustbin, 49 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 289 (2007).
41. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
42. Id. at 233.
43. Id. at 235.
44. Id. at 244 ("Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a
jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
45. Justice Ginsburg joined both majority opinions, choosing Justice Breyer's remedy over
the preferred solution of the merits majority. See supra note 37.
46. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.
47. Id. at 249-50.
2008] 275
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
system,"48 the remedial majority excised the mandatory provision
from the SRA49 and the appellate standard of review. ° The Court
still expected judges to sentence according to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).51
Though the Guidelines would be merely advisory, judges must still
"take them into account when sentencing." 2 In theory, advisory
Guidelines are constitutional because sentences do not necessarily
require judge-found facts, and the judge is free to impose a sentence
anywhere between the statutory minimum and maximum. The
Court hoped its solution would accomplish its twin goals of fewer
unwarranted sentencing disparities and constitutional, individual-
ized sentences.53
The advisory Guidelines and uniform sentencing are in tension,
however. District courts will reduce sentencing disparities only to
the extent that they follow the Guidelines. Therefore, the Booker
remedial majority created an appellate standard of review, instruct-
ing the appellate courts to "review for 'unreasonable [ness]."' But
if the circuit courts still enforced the Guidelines, that would unravel
Booker's constitutional solution, because the constitutionality of the
post-Booker Guidelines depends on their advisory nature.
Justice Scalia suspected that reasonableness review was a poison
pill. Truly advisory Guidelines would not require reasonableness
review.55 Because appellate courts previously reviewed only delib-
erate departures from the Guidelines,56 Justice Scalia wrote, not
even the remedial majority "knows-and perhaps no one is meant
to know-how advisory Guidelines and 'unreasonableness' review
48. Id. at 252.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006).
50. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006).
51. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
52. Id. at 264.
53. Id. at 264-65.
54. Id. at 261. The remedial majority crafted the appellate standard of review, it said, by
finding an implied standard of review in the statutory text, and with an eye toward historical
tradition and practical considerations. Id. at 260-61. The Court effectively imported pre-
Booker appellate review when it noted that the post-Booker standard "was consistent with
appellate sentencing practice during the last two decades." Id. at 262. As Justice Scalia noted
in his dissent to the remedial opinion, however, pre-Booker reasonableness review "never
extended beyond review of deliberate departures from the Guidelines range." Id. at 310
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 306 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. See supra note 54.
276 [Vol. 50:267
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will function in practice."5 7 Faced with "unreasonableness" review,
the courts "might seek refuge in the familiar" and continue the
previous appellate practice of enforcing adherence to the
Guidelines."M Justice Scalia's prediction of "a discordant symphony
of different standards"59 was prescient.
D. After Booker
In many respects, the advisory Guidelines system looks much like
the pre-Booker mandatory system. At the district court level, little
has changed. "[P]re-Booker and post-Booker sentencing are identi-
cal, right up to the determination of a Guidelines range."6 ° The
probation officer still bases the presentence report on facts relevant
to the Guidelines calculation.6 Upon review of the report, the
sentencing judge makes findings of fact and calculates the corre-
sponding Guidelines range.62 Then the judge determines whether
such a sentence is consistent with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a),63 and either sentences within the range or chooses a
sentence outside the range that serves the § 3553(a) factors.64
Lastly, the judge must explain his sentence in terms of the § 3553(a)
factors.65 Pre- and post-Booker sentences are also substantively
similar. One study found that district courts sentence below the
57. Booker, 543 U.S. at 311 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 312; see also id. at 311-12 ("[The remedial majority's gross exaggerations [that
the reasonableness standard is 'already familiar to appellate courts] may lead some courts
of appeals to conclude-may indeed be designed to lead courts of appeals to conclude-that
little has changed.").
59. Id. at 312.
60. Graham C. Mullen & J.P. Davis, Mandatory Guidelines: The Oxymoronic State of
Sentencing After United States v. Booker, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 625, 639 (2007).
61. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2460 (2007).
62. Mullen & Davis, supra note 60, at 631 (describing post-Booker sentencing procedures
in the Fourth Circuit); see also UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON
THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING, at v (2006) [hereinafter
POST-BOOKER FINAL REPORT] ("[C]ircuit courts have now uniformly agreed that all post-
Booker sentencing must begin with calculation of the applicable guideline range.").
63. See supra note 24.
64. Mullen & Davis, supra note 60, at 631-32.
65. Id. at 632. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2006) ("The court, at the time of sentencing,
shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.").
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Guidelines range only about seven to eight percent more often than
before Booker.66
Circuit courts have tried to reconcile Booker's "seemingly
internally inconsistent holdings" 7 and determine what constitutes
unreasonable sentences. Some circuits reached for familiar appel-
late tools. Believing that the Sentencing Commission based the
Guidelines on all the § 3553(a) factors, one group of judges "held
that courts should continue to follow the Guidelines in all but
extraordinary cases. The position of [this] school later morphed into
the notion that appellate courts should 'presume" that within-
Guidelines sentences are reasonable.68 Seven circuits adopted a
presumption that within-Guidelines sentences are reasonable.
69
Nine circuits adopted an aggressive system for policing outside-
Guidelines sentences:" a "proportionality" review that requires
increased justification for a sentence the further it is from the
66. The U.S. Sentencing Commission compared the year following Booker to the pre-
Booker period and found that within-Guidelines range sentences decreased by 8.9 percent, and
below-range sentences increased by 6.7 percent. POST-BOOKER FINAL REPORT, supra note 62,
at 57. Using a later period, another study found that Booker increased below-Guidelines
sentences by about 8 percent. Alexander P. Robbins & Lynda Lao, The Effect of Presumptions:
An Empirical Examination of Inter-Circuit Sentencing Disparities After United States v.
Booker 22 (Nov. 4, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027541.
67. United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 591 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting Booker's "confusing
nature").
68. Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Rita, District Court Discretion, and Fairness in Federal
Sentencing, 85 DENV. U. L. REv. 51, 52 (2007) (citing Amy Baron-Evans, The Continuing
Struggle for Just, Effective and Constitutional Sentencing After United States v. Booker,
CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 32-33) (footnote omitted). The idea that the Guidelines account
for the § 3553(a) factors "appeared in a district court decision the day after Booker was
decided," then in the Sentencing Commission's congressional testimony, then in a Commission
training program for judges, probation officers, and prosecutors, and then in judicial opinions
across the country. Baron-Evans, supra, at 33. This idea runs counter to "the Commission's
own reports, the guidelines manual, and reliable historical sources." Id.
69. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007) (citing United States v. Dorcely,
454 F.3d 366, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 436
F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005); and United States v. Kristl, 437
F.3d 1050, 1053-54 (10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)). The First, Second, Third, and Eleventh
Circuits have rejected the presumption. Id.
70. Before Gall, the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits adopted proportionality review, and no circuit rejected it. Brief for the
United States at 13 n.3, Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007) (No. 06-7949).
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Guidelines range.7 These standards of review have led the circuit
courts to affirm essentially all within-Guidelines sentences as
reasonable.72 Between Booker and Rita, circuits reversed below-
range sentences twenty times as often as above-range sentences.73
The courts' responses to Booker showed that "the federal sentencing
system [is] almost impervious to dramatic doctrinal change in the
status of the Guidelines."74 This lack of change suggests that the
Guidelines are not truly advisory.
II. RITA AND GALL: USING AMBIGUITY To SOLVE CONFUSION
The Supreme Court addressed post-Booker sentencing in two
major opinions in 2007, Rita v. United States and Gall v. United
States. Although both decisions clarified appellate reasonableness
review in some ways, their ambiguous and even contradictory
language allows the Guidelines' constitutional problems to persist.
A. Rita: Something for Everyone
Confronting the tension between uniformity and the advisory
Guidelines, the Supreme Court in Rita v. United States sided with
uniformity and sanctioned the presumption of reasonableness.75
This result is unstable because of Rita's internal contradictions, and
undesirable because the presumption strongly encourages within-
Guidelines sentences.
71. The Court heard oral arguments regarding proportionality review in early October
2007. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 586 (2007).
72. United States v. Lazenby is the exception. POST-BOOKER FINAL REPORT, supra note 62,
at 35 (citing United States v. Lazenby, 439 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2006)). On remand, the district
court applied the same sentence as before to Lazenby and his co-conspirator, which the Eighth
Circuit affirmed. United States v. Goodwin, 486 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 2007).
73. POST-BooKER FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 35. A recent analysis of post-Booker
appellate review shows that circuit courts reverse "78.3 percent of below-range sentences
appealed by the government ... compared to 3.5 percent of above-range sentences appealed by
the defense." Paul J. Hofer, Empirical Questions and Evidence in Rita v. United States, 85
DENY. U. L. REV. 27, 36 (2007) (citing Brief for the Federal Public and Community Defenders
and the National Association of Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007) (No. 06-5754)).
74. Berman, supra note 12, at 22.
75. 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (2007).
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Victor Rita was a poster case for a non-Guidelines sentence. In
2004, Rita was convicted of perjury, making false statements, and
obstructing justice for lying under oath about whether he had
bought and returned a machine gun parts kit from a gun company
under federal investigation.76 The Guidelines offense level for
perjury is based on the "underlying offense" being investigated.77
The district court judge found that the Government investigated the
company for importing machine guns without authorization, so
Rita's offense level increased accordingly.7" Rita's criminal history
consisted of a prior conviction in 1986 which earned him probation,
resulting in the lowest criminal history level.79 Based on his offense
and criminal history, the Guidelines recommended thirty-three to
forty-one months in prison.8' Rita argued that he merited a below-
Guidelines sentence because of his poor physical condition, twenty-
five years of highly awarded military service, and his potential to be
a vulnerable target in prison because of his criminal justice work.81
"Unable to find" that the Guidelines range was "inappropriate," the
district court judge sentenced Rita to thirty-three months.8 2 Rita
argued on appeal that his sentence was greater than necessary and
unreasonable because the district court did not adequately consider
his history and characteristics. Despite Rita's argument, the Fourth
Circuit presumed that the sentence was reasonable and affirmed. 3
In some ways, Rita strengthened the advisory nature of the
Guidelines by limiting the presumption of reasonableness. First,
district courts may not presume that a Guidelines sentence is
appropriate.' Second, the Court did not require circuits to adopt the
presumption, or even suggest that they do so.85 Third, the appellate
courts are not bound by the presumption, as they are with a burden-
shifting "trial-related evidentiary presumption"86-- by which the
76. Id. at 2459-60.
77. Id. at 2460.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2460-61.
80. Id. at 2461.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2462.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2465.
85. Berman, supra note 12, at 13.
86. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463.
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Court seemed to mean that the presumption is a non-binding
suggestion that the sentence is correct. Fourth, Rita's holding "does
not mean that [circuit] courts may adopt a presumption of unreason-
ableness" to variances from the Guidelines range.8" Fifth, the Court
acknowledged the sentencing judge's "access to, and greater
familiarity with, the individual case and the individual defendant
before him than the Commission or the appeals court.""8 Given these
aspects of Rita, district courts should tailor sentences to each
individual defendant, taking account of the Guidelines range, but
not using the range as the default sentence.
Despite the Court's emphasis on the discretion of sentencing
courts, circuit courts could just as easily use Rita to encourage
within-Guidelines sentences. The district judge in Rita treated the
Guidelines sentence as the presumptive sentence when he said that
he was "unable to find" that it was "an inappropriate guideline
range." 9 Surprisingly, the Court regarded this very limited record
as sufficient to show that the judge adequately considered the
defendant's arguments.9 ° Such an analysis allows judges to provide
fewer reasons for within-Guidelines sentences.
The Court encouraged district courts to treat the Guidelines as
the benchmark.9 The presumption of reasonableness, the Court
said,
reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals court is considering
a within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing
judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the
same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case.
That double determination significantly increases the likelihood
that the sentence is a reasonable one.92
This approach is theoretically reasonable, if the sentence and the
Guidelines calculation are independently determined. But because
87. Id. at 2467.
88. Id. at 2469.
89. Id. at 2462.
90. Id. at 2469.
91. In Gall, the Court used the term "benchmark" in instructing the district courts to
begin sentencing with the appropriate Guidelines calculation. Gall v. United States, 128 S.
Ct. 586, 596 (2007).
92. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463 (third emphasis added).
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judges assume that the Guidelines already account for the § 3553(a)
factors, these decisions are not necessarily separate or independent.
The Court then undercut the idea that the two determinations
are independent. The Court repeatedly asserted that because the
Sentencing Commission built the § 3553(a) factors into the Guide-
lines,9 3 "it is fair to assume that the Guidelines ... reflect a rough
approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)'s objec-
tives."94 These arguments, even if dicta, allow district courts to
assume that a Guidelines sentence embodies the § 3553(a) factors.
Furthermore, the Court's own instructions for sentencing presume
that within-Guidelines sentences are appropriate.95 And procedur-
ally, although § 3553 requires explanations for all sentences, within-
Guidelines sentences require only a limited explanation. If "the
judge has found that the case before him is typical" and decides to
sentence within the Guidelines range, and a party does not contest
the Guidelines sentence, "the judge normally need say no more."96
The judge has little to justify if he sentences within-range, which
has all the trappings of a procedural presumption. Despite Rita's
holding that the presumption of reasonableness does not apply at
the district court level, the decision provides many tools for circuit
courts to favor within-Guidelines sentences. 7
93. Id. at 2463. Amy Baron-Evans argues that this argument does not withstand
historical scrutiny. See supra note 68.
94. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2464-65; see also id. at 2463 ('The upshot is that the sentencing
statutes envision both the sentencing judge and the Commission carrying out the same basic
§ 3553(a) objectives, the one, at retail, the other at wholesale.").
95. Id. at 2465 ('The sentencing judge, as a matter of process, will normally begin by
considering the presentence report and its interpretation of the Guidelines. He may hear
arguments by prosecution or defense that the Guidelines sentence should not apply, perhaps
because ... the case at hand falls outside the heartland' to which the Commission intends the
individual Guidelines to apply, perhaps because the Guidelines sentence itself fails properly
to reflect § 3553(a) considerations, or perhaps because the case warrants a different sentence
regardless." (citations ommitted)).
96. Id. at 2468.
97. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens acknowledged the courts' failure to treat
the Guidelines as truly advisory but hoped that Rita would sufficiently reform the system.
"Given the clarity of our holding, I trust that those judges who had treated the Guidelines as
virtually mandatory during the post-Booker interregnum will now recognize that the
Guidelines are truly advisory." Id. at 2474 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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B. GalL" Proportionality Review Prohibited?
Gall v. United States did for outside-Guidelines sentences what
Rita did for within-Guidelines sentences: helpfully clarified the
limits of reasonableness review while leaving open many opportuni-
ties for abuse. In Gall, the Supreme Court considered whether the
circuit courts could apply proportionality review-an aggressive
standard requiring "justification... 'proportional to the extent of the
difference between the advisory range and the sentence imposed"'98
-to outside-Guidelines sentences.99 Some circuits employed
mathematical formulas, requiring district judges to meet increas-
ingly higher bars of justification at each benchmark. 100 Commonly,
a certain percentage variance from the Guidelines range triggered
a requirement of "extraordinary circumstances.""' Circuits adopting
the "extraordinary circumstances" test reversed outside-Guidelines
sentences as unreasonable three times as often as within-Guidelines
sentences.0 2 By foreclosing a range of available sentences and
98. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007) (quoting United States v. Gall, 446
F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2006)).
99. In addition to the Eighth Circuit, seven other circuits had adopted proportionality
review, and none had rejected it. See supra note 70.
100. United States v. Hildreth displays the review at its most absurd and arbitrary. 485
F.3d 1120 (10th Cir. 2007). Comparing Hildreth's sentence to similar defendants, the court
established a common law of percentages by comparison to other sentences: a 471 percent
upward variance from the Guidelines range is an "extreme divergence" requiring "dramatic
facts" to be substantively reasonable. Id. at 1127. "Substantial" divergences, such as a 122
percent upward variance from the Guidelines range, require "compelling reasons"; and
"significant" divergences, such as a 37 percent upward variance, require "sufficient
explanation and justification." Id. at 1127-28.
101. See United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 261 n.16 (3d Cir. 2007) (requiring
"extraordinary circumstances" for a four-month sentence where the Guidelines range was
thirty-seven to forty-six months); United States v. Richardson, No. 05-4817, 2007 WL
1413075, at *2 (4th Cir. May 11, 2007) (finding insufficient "extraordinary" factors for a 180-
month sentence where the Guidelines range was 324 to 405 months); United States v. Davis,
458 F.3d 491,496 (6th Cir. 2006) (requiring "extraordinary circumstances" for a 99.89 percent
variance); United States v. Wallace, 458 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 2006) (requiring
"extraordinary circumstances" for a sentence of probation, a 100 percent variance); Gall, 446
F.3d at 889 (same); United States v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479, 481 (8th Cir. 2006) (requiring
"extraordinary circumstances" for a 60 percent downward variance).
102. Brief Amici Curiae of the Federal Public and Community Defenders and the National
Association of Federal Defenders in Support of Petitioner 13-14, Gall v. United States, 128
S. Ct. 586 (2007) (No. 06-7949).
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replacing the district courts' judgment, the circuits' proportionality
review "closely resembled de novo review."' °
Like Rita, Gall v. United States presented an ideal defendant for
a below-Guidelines sentence. Brian Gall was involved in an ecstasy
sales ring as a college sophomore for seven months in 2000.1°4 He
stopped using ecstasy within two months of joining the conspiracy
and later withdrew from the conspiracy. °5 That was the last of his
illegal drug involvement. After his withdrawal, he "self-rehabili-
tated" by graduating from college, becoming a master carpenter, and
starting his own business.106 When federal agents questioned him
about the ecstasy conspiracy, he fully cooperated and admitted his
involvement.' °7 He was indicted in April 2004 for conspiracy to
distribute ecstasy, cocaine, and marijuana."°8 Gall pleaded guilty to
his participation in the conspiracy. Based on his involvement and
without any criminal history, the Guidelines recommended thirty to
thirty-seven months in prison.' °9 Because of Gall's withdrawal, his
exemplary post-offense conduct, his otherwise clean criminal
history, and his age at the time of the offense, the district court
judge sentenced him to three years of supervised probation."1 °
Applying proportionality review and noting that Gall's sentence was
a 100 percent downward variance, not "supported by extraordinary
circumstances," the Eighth Circuit reversed his sentence."'
The Gall Court attempted to end proportionality review. The
Court asserted that it had "made it pellucidly clear" in Booker and
Rita that appellate reasonableness review is an abuse-of-discretion
standard." 2 Circuit courts may not require "extraordinary" circum-
stances or use a "rigid mathematical formula that uses the percent-
age of a variance as the standard for determining the strength of the
103. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 600.
104. Id. at 591-92.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 592.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 592-93.
110. Id. at 593.
111. Id. at 594.
112. Id. at 594-95. Despite Gall's claims about the Court's earlier clarity, neither "abuse"
nor "abuse of discretion" appeared in Booker. Rita only mentioned "abuse of discretion" once
in passing, 127 S. Ct. 2456,2465 (2007), a "new formulation" that surprised the Tenth Circuit.
United States v. Angel-Guzman, 506 F.3d 1007, 1014 (10th Cir. 2007).
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justifications required for a specific sentence.""' 3 These tests, the
Court instructed, "come too close to creating an impermissible
presumption of unreasonableness." '114
Taken alone, those holdings could preclude any form of propor-
tionality review. But Gall created ample room for circuit courts to
review outside-Guidelines sentences more stringently. Appellate
courts may "consider the extent of a deviation from the
Guidelines." ''1 The Court even instructed district courts to "give
serious consideration to the extent of any departure from the
Guidelines and ... explain [the] conclusion that an unusually lenient
or an unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in a particular case
with sufficient justifications."'16 This mandate contradicts the
Court's argument that a "heightened" standard of review is
inconsistent with abuse-of-discretion review." 7 The Court further
obscured its holding by stating, matter-of-factly, '"We find it
uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a
more significant justification than a minor one.""' As a whole, Gall
suggests that circuit courts may impose a heightened standard on
outside-Guidelines sentences, so long as the standard does not
expressly employ an "extraordinary circumstances" or "rigid
mathematical formula" test.
III. RITA AND GALL APPLIED
A. Standards of Review
As this Note observes with respect to Booker, the Supreme Court's
decisions and the appellate courts' interpretations of them can be
quite different. To examine closely the impact of Rita and Gall on
the appellate review of sentences, this Note focuses on the Sixth and
Tenth Circuits, chosen because of their well-developed case law,
notable majority and dissenting opinions, and different approaches
113. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 594. Elsewhere, the Court said that a district judge "must consider the extent
of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the
degree of the variance." Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 596.
118. Id. at 597.
2008] 285
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:267
to reasonableness. Admittedly, discerning circuits' broad trends
through individual cases is an imperfect method. One three-judge
panel can destroy a circuit's uniform approach, and one circuit
judge's emphasis may slightly alter the case law. Despite these
shortcomings, this Note aims to represent accurately each circuit's
law and recognize internal differences.
As a whole, reasonableness review is an abuse-of-discretion
standard,"9 which means that appellate courts review legal deter-
minations de novo 120 and factual determinations for clear error.21
The Sixth and Tenth Circuits divide reasonableness review into
procedural and substantive components.'22 Generally, as the
Supreme Court clarified in Gall, a sentence is procedurally reason-
able if the judge considered the appropriate factors, correctly
calculated the advisory Guidelines range, and adequately stated his
reasons. 2 ' Substantive reasonableness is much more subjective. In
the Sixth Circuit, a sentence is substantively unreasonable "when
119. Id. at 597. Although Gall established that reasonableness review is an abuse-of-
discretion review, see supra text accompanying note 112, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits
implicitly applied abuse-of-discretion review before Gall because they reviewed legal
determinations de novo and factual determinations for clear error. See United States v. Fink,
502 F.3d 585, 587 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Garcia-Lara, 499 F.3d 1133, 1135-36 (10th
Cir. 2007). Generally, abuse-of-discretion review is appropriate when "[a] decision committed
to a trial judge's discretion is a decision with respect to which Congress or the courts have
decided that there is no single right or wrong answer, but a range of acceptable choices."
HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELUOTT, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF REVIEW: APPELLATE
COURT REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY ACTIONS 16 (2007).
120. Conclusions of law are normally subject to de novo review, which "afford[s] no
deference to the trial judge's decision." EDWARDS & ELLIOTT, supra note 119, at 5, 7.
121. "Clear error" review presumes that the trial judge's findings of fact are correct. Id. at
20. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 506 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 2007).
122. See United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Davis, 458 F.3d 505, 510 (6th Cir. 2006). Other circuits also divide reasonableness review into
substantive and procedural components. See, e.g., United States v. Tomko, 498 F.3d 157, 164
(3d Cir. 2007), vacated and reh'g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v.
Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th
Cir. 2006).
123. In reviewing procedural reasonableness, appellate courts must ensure that the district
court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider
the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits have adopted Gall's
language for procedural reasonableness review. See United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 539
(6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Martinez, 512 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2008).
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the district court selects the sentence arbitrarily, bases the
sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider pertinent
§ 3553(a) factors or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any
pertinent factor."'24 Although the first three prongs of this test are
somewhat objective, the fourth is completely subjective because the
reasonable amount of weight may vary from judge to judge. The
Tenth Circuit's definition of substantive reasonableness is even
more vague: "A substantively reasonable sentence ultimately
reflects the gravity of the crime and the § 3553(a) factors as applied
to the case."'25 If substantive reasonableness depends on such
subjective measures, the standard has little to no content. There-
fore, an appellate court may easily use the standard to substitute its
judgment for the district court's and enforce adherence to the
Guidelines.
Despite and because of Rita and Gall, circuits can enforce
adherence to the Guidelines through three primary tools: the
presumption of reasonableness and proportionality review, which
are both components of substantive reasonableness review, and
procedural reasonableness. This Note will now analyze each of those
tools and the Sixth and Tenth Circuits' use of them.
B. Presumption of Reasonableness
The presumption of reasonableness may violate the Sixth
Amendment because it shields from review sentences that require
judge-found facts. The operation of the presumption at the appellate
level is relatively simple. The appellate court presumes that a
sentence falling within a properly calculated Guidelines range is
reasonable.126 The defendant must rebut the presumption by
showing that the sentence is procedurally or substantively unrea-
sonable.' 27
The constitutionality of the presumption rests on the premise that
judge-found facts are not absolutely necessary to the final sentence.
124. United States v. Keller, 498 F.3d 316, 322 (6th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).
125. Atencio, 476 F.3d at 1102.
126. United States v. Madden, 515 F.3d 601, 609 (6th Cir. 2008) ("[A] sentence that falls
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[T]he presumption, even if it increases the likelihood that the
judge, not the jury, will find "sentencing facts," does not violate
the Sixth Amendment. This Court's Sixth Amendment cases do
not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of
factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the
sentence in consequence. 2 '
Because the presumption is a "nonbinding appellate presumption,"
the sentencing judge is not required to impose a Guidelines
sentence.'29 The Court assumed that the district court judge may
freely assign any sentence between the statutory minimum and
maximum. If that is the case, then judge-found facts and the
advisory Guidelines range are mere factors among many that judges
may use to select a sentence. A judge could find facts that would
triple a Guidelines sentence, but still permissibly sentence the
defendant well below the Guidelines range. The constitutionality of
the presumption of reasonableness completely depends on the truly
advisory nature of the Guidelines.
The Court's defense of the presumption does not withstand
even minimal scrutiny, as Justice Scalia demonstrated in his Rita
dissent. The presumption itself is not unconstitutional, he allowed.
In some cases, however, reasonableness review will violate the Sixth
Amendment "because there will be some sentences that will be
upheld as reasonable only because of the existence of judge-found
facts."'3 ° Justice Scalia offered the hypothetical of a defendant
convicted of robbery."13 With the lowest level of criminal history, the
Guidelines range would be thirty-three to forty-one months. If the
judge found certain additional facts by a preponderance of the
evidence, the Guidelines range would be 235 to 293 months. 32 Given
the presumption of reasonableness, the appellate court would affirm
a 293-month sentence because the sentence would be within the
Guidelines range. But had the judge still varied upward to 293
months without finding those particular facts, "the sentence would
128. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465-66.
129. Id. at 2466.
130. Id. at 2478 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2477.
132. Id. The judge would need to find that the defendant discharged a firearm, inflicted
serious bodily injury on a victim, and stole more than $5 million. Id.
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surely be reversed as unreasonably excessive." '133 While this
argument depends on the circuit court using proportionality review
to reverse such a sentence, the presumption of reasonableness
makes judge-found facts essential to some sentences.
This situation does not exist only in Justice Scalia's hypothetical,
contrary to the Rita Court's suggestion.'34 Appellate courts regularly
use the presumption of reasonableness to affirm within-Guidelines
sentences based largely on facts that judges found by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. In one recent case, the judge's fact-finding
produced a Guidelines sentence of eighty-four months, which was
five times longer than the Guidelines sentence for the crime to
which the defendant pleaded guilty.'35 Applying the presumption of
reasonableness to the within-Guidelines sentence, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed. 3 ' Other circuits have recently used the presumption to
affirm sentences in which the district judge increased the Guide-
lines range by finding facts by a preponderance of the evidence.
37
Because these sentences were within the Guidelines range,
appellate courts affirmed them with very little scrutiny.
In practice, the appellate courts use the presumption of reason-
ableness as a rubber stamp for Guidelines sentences. For a "rebut-
table" presumption, the numbers are astounding: appellate
courts have reversed as substantively unreasonable only one
within-Guidelines sentence since Booker. 3' That track record has
convinced Judge Michael W. McConnell of the Tenth Circuit
"that the rebuttability of the presumption [of reasonableness] is
more theoretical than real."'39 He suspects "that a substantively
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2467 (majority opinion) ("And [Justice Scalia's] need to rely on hypotheticals to
make his point is consistent with our view that the approach adopted here will not 'raise a
multitude of constitutional problems."').
135. United States v. Sedore, 512 F.3d 819, 829 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 827-28 (majority opinion). The Sixth Circuit recently affirmed another sentence
in which the judge applied sentencing enhancements based on a preponderance of the
evidence. United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 541 (6th Cir. 2008).
137. See United States v. Lopez-DeLeon, 513 F.3d 472, 473, 475-76 (5th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Carter, 510 F.3d 593, 596-97, 601-03 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ramirez-
Vazquez, No. 07-2074, 2007 WL 3194102, at *1, *3 (10th Cir. Oct. 25, 2007).
138. See POST-BOOKER FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 30.
139. United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1166 (10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J.,
concurring). McConnell writes,
The process reminds me of the "snipe hunts" of my boyhood years in the Scouts,
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unreasonable within-Guidelines sentence does not exist."'4 Rita
only exacerbated the practice of blindly applying the presumption,
as both the Sixth and the Tenth Circuits interpreted the decision as
confirming the validity of their reasonableness review. 141 Moreover,
Gall's holding that appellate courts must apply an abuse-of-
discretion standard reinforced the presumption of reasonableness.
The presumption creates a strong "gravitational pull"'42 toward
the Guidelines at the district court level. Some district judges have
treated the Guidelines as presumptively reasonable at sentencing. 14
3
Rita's express prohibition of this practice will prevent district courts
from explicitly presuming that a Guidelines sentence is appropriate.
If anything, though, Rita encourages district courts to treat the
Guidelines range as the default sentence. 4 4 The Sixth Circuit has
further entrenched the presumption at the district court level by
requiring the defendant to object to his sentence as procedurally
unreasonable at sentencing, or essentially waive that objection on
appeal. 4 1 If reasonableness is the standard by which a sentence will
where the older boys would take the younger ones out in the woods at night in
search for creatures that turned out not to exist. Great fun, for Boy Scouts. So
far, in the post-Booker forest, only one apparent snipe has been found, and it
turned out, on remand, not to be a snipe after all.
Id. at 1173.
140. Id.
141. United States v. Garcia-Lara, 499 F.3d 1133, 1135 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Liou, 491 F.3d 334, 339 (6th Cir. 2007). Most other circuits have done the same. Berman,
supra note 12, at 22 n.90 (citing United States v. Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir.
2007); United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 257 (3rd Cir. 2007); United States v. Boleware, 498
F.3d 859, 861-62 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. D'Amico, 496 F.3d 95, 106 n.10 (1st Cir.
2007); United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306, 1314 n.11 (11th Cir. 2007)).
142. Justice Souter used the term "gravitational pull" for district court judges' attraction
toward the Guidelines range after Booker. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2487 (2007)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 501 F.3d 851, 852 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167, 1168 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Wilms, 495 F.3d 277, 279 (6th
Cir. 2007).
144. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Birkett, 501
F. Supp. 2d 269, 280 (D. Mass. 2007) (arguing that Rita "encourages and insulates a within-
guideline sentence"); Berman, supra note 12, at 18 (arguing that, in light of Rita's conflicting
language, 'lower courts still cannot be sure if they should embrace further expansion of
judicial sentencing discretion").
145. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (applying plain
error review to a sentence's procedural reasonableness where the district court judge
completely failed to address the defendant's arguments for a downward variance, and the
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be judged on appeal, a district court will understandably follow that
standard. The Guidelines create a very alluring option for district
courts: why risk reversal when a Guidelines sentence is practically
unassailable? For that reason, Rita and the presumption of reason-
ableness bias the sentencing regime in favor of within-Guidelines
sentences.
C. Disparate Sentencing Explanations
Rita approved the relaxed procedural reasonableness review of
within-Guidelines sentences, another key element of the Guidelines'
gravitational pull. One of the requirements of procedural reason-
ableness is that the district court "adequately explain the chosen
sentence-including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range."'46 That requirement is derived from the SRA.'47
Some circuits, however, have created two different standards:
within-Guidelines sentences require only a cursory explanation,
but outside-Guidelines sentences require a detailed explanation.'48
defendant declined to raise any additional objections at the end of the hearing).
146. See supra note 123.
147. "The court ... shall state in open court the reasons for ... the particular sentence." 18
U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2006). Within-Guidelines sentences require "the reason for imposing a
sentence at a particular point within the range," whereas outside-Guidelines sentences
require "the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from [the Guidelines
range]." § 3553(c)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
148. Berman, supra note 12, at 15. See also United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 990-94
(8th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 331 n.36 (3rd Cir. 2007)
(noting that "a sentencing court must provide a 'fuller explanation' when it 'imposes a
sentence that varies significantly from the advisory Guidelines range (quoting United States
v. Kononchuk, 485 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 2007)); United States v. Battle, 499 F.3d 315, 323
(4th Cir. 2007) ("In some cases, applying a Guidelines sentence will in itself be sufficient to
demonstrate that the district court has considered the § 3553(a) factors."); United States v.
Tyra 454 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Myers, 439 F.3d 415, 418 (8th
Cir. 2006) (observing that the Eighth Circuit affirms within-Guidelines sentences where the
district court did not "categorically rehearse" each § 3553(a) factor); United States v. Simpson,
430 F.3d 1177, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ('[Ilt is enough to calculate the range accurately and
explain why (if the sentence lies outside it) this defendant deserves more or less.' (quoting
United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2005)); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d
511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that a sentence within the properly calculated Guidelines
range requires "little explanation").
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Appellate courts often use the double standard to push sentences
toward the Guidelines range.149
To the Rita Court, the double standard is uncontroversial. If the
judge sentences within the Guidelines range, and neither party
contests the sentence, then no further explanation is necessary. 5 °
This lower bar for procedural reasonableness creates three main
problems. First, it is contrary to the SRA. Although 18 U.S.C. §
3553(c) requires judges to provide "the specific reason" for outside-
Guidelines sentences, they must still provide "the reason" for
within-Guidelines sentences.' 5 ' Judges must explain all sentences,
not only outside-Guidelines sentences, indicating that judges must
weigh factors other than the Guidelines. Conveniently, those factors
are listed nearby at § 3553(a), and the Guidelines range is only one
factor among nine.'52 Based on the statute, judges sentencing within
the Guidelines should explain why such a sentence is appropriate in
light of the listed criminal justice goals.
Second, the double standard for sentencing explanations helps
to create a presumption of reasonableness at the district court level
in some circuits. According to one district court judge, one prime
reason that judges did not "eagerly exercise their newfound discre-
tion" after Booker is "the fact that it is easier to sentence within the
Guidelines."'53 According to another district court judge, this rule
effectively extends the presumption of reasonableness to the
sentencing court.' Outside-Guidelines sentences require more
procedural labor from the district courts. 'To busy courts, that alone
149. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d 188, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that, where the majority found an above-Guidelines sentence
procedurally unreasonable because the district court did not sufficiently detail its reasoning,
despite the court plainly setting out its reasons, the reversal "illustrates the magnetic pull
that the Guidelines still occasionally exert over appellate courts in cases involving sentences
outside the Guidelines range"); United States v. Pefia-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d 1108, 1117 (10th
Cir. 2008) (finding sentence of 121 months where Guidelines advised 324 to 405 months
procedurally unreasonable because the explanation was inadequate "especially where the
variance from the guidelines range is as large as this").
150. See supra text accompanying note 96.
151. See supra note 147.
152. See supra note 24.
153. Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 68, at 54.
154. Mullen & Davis, supra note 60, at 633 (noting that, "at the absolute most," the judge
"is required to state that he has considered the factors in § 3553(a) with no further
elaboration").
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has a gravitational pull,"' 5 wrote a third district court judge. The
additional labor creates a disincentive to sentence outside the
Guidelines range.
Third, despite Rita's language supporting the rule, Gall requires
more from the district court. Under Gall, the district court "must
make an individualized assessment" and "adequately explain the
chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to
promote the perception of fair sentencing."'5 6 Simply "utter[ing] one
sentence indicating that [the sentencing factors] had been consid-
ered" ' 5 is neither individualized nor adequate for meaningful
review.' 8 Yet the Tenth Circuit found a sentence with such an
explanation procedurally reasonable. 9 Although some circuits
require more detailed explanations of within-Guidelines sentences
from their district courts,' 60 the Supreme Court's ambiguity
undermines its own holdings and allows the circuits to favor heavily
the Guidelines.
D. Proportionality Review
If the presumption of reasonableness is the carrot of reasonable-
ness review, then proportionality review is the stick that circuit
courts use to police outside-Guidelines sentences. After Gall,
proportionality review is still in flux. The initial appellate decisions
indicate that Gall did not end proportionality review and its
155. Nancy Gertner, Rita Needs Gall-How to Make the Guidelines Advisory, 85 DENV. U.
L. REv. 63, 70 (2007).
156. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).
157. United States v. Rivera-Morales, No. 07-2003, 2008 WL 80661, at *5 (10th Cir. Jan.
8, 2008).
158. The exemption from providing explanations for within-Guidelines sentences effectively
prevents any substantive reasonableness review of them, further strengthening the
presumption of reasonableness. See The Supreme Court, 2006 Term-Leading Cases, 121
HARV. L. REv. 245, 251 (2007).
159. Rivera-Morales, 2008 WL 80661, at *6.
160. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 488 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding a
sentence procedurally unreasonable where the Sixth Circuit was "unable to find any
discussion of the reasons for which the district court chose the sentence"); United States v.
Mitchell, No. 06-1070, 2007 WL 1544230, at *8 (6th Cir. May 25, 2007) (holding that a district
court cannot "[s]imply stat[e] that there is 'no persuasive reason' to depart from the
Guidelines range" without analyzing the § 3553(a) factors).
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constitutional abuses, but rather only reined in its most extreme
versions.
1. Pre-Gall Proportionality Review
Before Gall, nine circuits had adopted proportionality review.161
Generally, the further that a sentence fell outside the Guidelines
range, the more justification a circuit court would require.'62 The
circuits' applications of the standard differed, however. The Sixth
Circuit crafted a relatively deferential proportionality review. The
court usually allowed district courts to treat the Guidelines as
advisory, repeatedly affirming sentences well below the Guidelines
range.6 3 The court was especially cognizant that although it might
have imposed a different judgment than the district court, reason-
ableness review is not de novo.'" If the district court sufficiently
justified a particular sentence, the Sixth Circuit "hesitate[d] to
'second guess' [its] determination."'65 For the most part, the Sixth
Circuit allowed outside-Guidelines sentences.
At the extremes, however, the Sixth Circuit applied a unique, less
deferential form of proportionality. Beginning with United States v.
Davis, the Sixth Circuit required sentences at or near the maximum
or minimum prison time to leave "room to make reasoned distinc-
tions" between the defendant and more worthy, future defen-
dants.'66 For example, if the statutory minimum sentence were
161. See supra note 70.
162. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491, 496 (6th Cir. 2006) ('"[The farther the
judge's sentence departs from the guidelines sentence ... the more compelling the justification
based on factors in section 3553(a)' must be." (quoting United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725,
729 (7th Cir. 2005))).
163. See United States v. Baker, 502 F.3d 465, 467 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming sentence of
probation when Guidelines advised 27 to 33 months). The court has proudly catalogued its
repeated affirmation of substantial variances. United States v. Poynter, 495 F.3d 349, 352-53
(6th Cir. 2007) (noting the Sixth Circuit's affirmation of variances ranging from a 99.91
percent downward variance to a 177 percent upward variance); United States v. Hairston, 502
F.3d 378, 379 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming 60-month sentence when Guidelines advised 121 to
151 months); United States v. Cherry, 487 F.3d 366, 371 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming 120-month
sentence when the Guidelines advised 210 to 262 months); United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d
318, 321-22 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming a sentence of home confinement and supervised release
when Guidelines advised 37 to 46 months).
164. Cherry, 487 F.3d at 372.
165. Husein, 478 F.3d at 328.
166. Davis, 458 F.3d at 499.
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thirty months, downward variances near that sentence required
"compelling justification" and "extraordinary circumstances.' 67 To
determine whether the circumstances were extraordinary, the
appellate court would carefully examine the facts of the case on its
own." Because the Davis rule required the court to speculate about
all past and future defendants, it became an absurd de novo review-
by-anecdote. 69 The Davis rule demonstrated that proportionality
review tempts even otherwise deferential circuits toward de novo
review.
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit's proportionality review more
aggressively reversed outside-Guidelines sentences. Similar to the
Sixth Circuit's Davis rule, an "extreme variance" from the Guide-
lines required "dramatic facts.' 70 In United States v. Hildreth, the
court employed the sort of mathematical analysis that Gall now
forbids.' 7 ' Even though the district court thoroughly justified the
sentence of probation with proper considerations under § 3553(a),
the Tenth Circuit concluded that the lower court "essentially
ignored the recommendation of the sentencing Guidelines.' ' 2 When
the Guidelines advised a sentence of 262 to 327 months, a 140-
month sentence required "particular characteristics of the defendant
that are sufficiently uncommon.' 73 Under such a review, the Tenth
Circuit did not ask whether the district court had exceeded its
discretion, but rather reweighed the facts and reached its own
167. United States v. Borho, 485 F.3d 904, 913-14 (6th Cir. 2007).
168. See Davis, 458 F.3d at 498-99.
169. When a majority of a panel weighed a lenient sentence against the parsimony
provision of § 3553(a) instead of the Davis rule, and affirmed, United States v. Hairston, 502
F.3d 378, 385-86 (6th Cir. 2007), Judge Batchelder dissented, attempting to determine
whether the defendant was "the most worthy crack dealer." Id. at 387 (Batchelder, J.,
dissenting). "If Mother Teresa sold 5 grams of crack then she could not possibly get less prison
time than the majority opinion approves for [the defendant]." Id. at 388.
170. United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 594, 596 (10th Cir. 2006) (reversing sentence of
six days imprisonment when Guidelines advised forty-six to fifty-seven months).
171. Comparing the defendant's sentence to similar defendants, the Tenth Circuit
observed: a 471 percent upward variance is an "extreme divergence" requiring "dramatic
facts"; "substantial" divergences, such as a 122 percent upward variance, require "compelling
reasons"; and "significant" divergences, such as a 37 percent upward variance, require
"sufficient explanation and justification." United States v. Hildreth, 485 F.3d 1120, 1127-28
(10th Cir. 2007).
172. Id. at 1129.
173. United States v. Garcia-Lara, 499 F.3d 1133, 1140 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations
omitted).
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conclusion. One dissenter, Judge Carlos F. Lucero, criticized the
circuit's substantive reasonableness review as "hunt[ing] the white
whale of disparity, a hunt which has required us to exercise a
degree of scrutiny closer to de novo than abuse of discretion.""1 4
Before Gall, the Tenth Circuit's de novo form of proportionality
review essentially confined district courts to the Guidelines.
2. Proportionality Review's Constitutional Problems
Judge Lucero's criticism highlights the constitutional problems
with proportionality review. The "extraordinary circumstances"
form of proportionality review was essentially de novo, as Judge
Lucero argued in Garcia-Lara, and the Supreme Court noted in
Gall. 7' It enabled an appellate court to weigh the facts on its own,
asking if it would have reached the same sentence, rather than
deferring to the district court. Quite often, the appellate courts
would have imposed a Guidelines sentence rather than an outside-
Guidelines sentence.'76 Although many of the circuit courts em-
ployed proportionality review to maintain sentencing uniformity, 77
the review still created what the Supreme Court called an "imper-
missible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the
Guidelines range."'78 Compared to the presumption of reasonable-
ness, proportionality review is the more serious violation of Booker.
While the presumption of reasonableness creates a preference for
Guidelines sentences, proportionality review drives sentences
toward the Guidelines and restricts district courts' freedom to
sentence outside the Guidelines. As a result, judge-found facts are
often necessary to adjust the Guidelines range, so that the resulting
sentence withstands an appeal. Such a system closely resembles the
mandatory Guidelines that Booker supposedly eliminated.
174. Id. at 1145 (Lucero, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099,
1111 (10th Cir. 2007) (Kelly, J., dissenting) ("The developing case law in this Circuit on the
question of appellate review of sentences can only be described as hostile to the advisory
Guidelines scheme mandated by Booker.").
175. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 600 (2007).
176. See supra note 101.
177. See Garcia-Lara, 499 F.3d at 1141.
178. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595.
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3. Proportionality Review After Gall
Though Gall may have intended to end proportionality review, its
ambiguity may enable appellate courts to continue using the review.
As noted earlier, Gall only prohibited "rigid mathematical formulas"
and an "extraordinary circumstances" test, but expressly allowed
appellate courts to consider the extent of the deviation from the
Guidelines. 17' Further, the Court required district courts to consider
the extent of an "unusually lenient" or "unusually harsh" deviation
from the Guidelines.8 ° Appellate courts will likely deem a district
court's failure to do so a reversible error, or at least note it on the
record.
Gall's ambiguity is evident in the circuits' varying reactions. The
Tenth Circuit appears to have taken Gall's abuse of discretion
language to heart. The court's new, post-Gall substantive reason-
ableness standard accords the district courts wide sentencing
discretion.' In United States v. Smart,"2 a divided Tenth Circuit
panel affirmed a 120-month sentence where the Guidelines range
was 168 to 210 months' imprisonment.1 83 The court held that Gall
"cannot be reconciled" with its pre-Gall reasonableness review"
and eschewed re-weighing the § 3553(a) factors de novo. s5 More
recently, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a defendant's sentence of one
year and one day in prison, home confinement, and supervised
release, where the Guidelines advised forty-six to fifty-seven
months' imprisonment. 86 Rejecting the government's argument that
the district court placed undue weight on the defendant's extraordi-
nary family circumstances, the Tenth Circuit found that the district
court did not abuse its discretion because the record supported its
reasons for a downward variance.1 7 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has
179. See supra notes 101, 103 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
181. United States v. Haley, 529 F.3d 1308, 1311 (10th Cir. 2008) ("A sentence is
substantively unreasonable if the length of the sentence is unreasonable given the totality of
the circumstances in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors." (citing United States v. Verdin-
Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 895 (10th Cir. 2008))).
182. 518 F.3d 800 (10th Cir. 2008).
183. Id. at 802.
184. Id. at 807.
185. Id.
186. United States v. Mufioz-Nava, 524 F.3d 1137, 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2008).
187. Id. at 1148.
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affirmed as substantively reasonable a sentence of eighteen
months' imprisonment for possession of child pornography where
the Guidelines range was seventy-eight to ninety-seven months.188
Although one of the district judge's reasons for the downward
variance was the defendant's lack of a criminal record, a factor
discouraged by the Guidelines, the Tenth Circuit still deferred to
the lower court: "[A]fter Gall and Kimbrough, a factor's disfavor by
the Guidelines no longer excludes it from consideration under §
3553(a).' ' 189 The Tenth Circuit's decisions indicate that it is fully
willing to defer to the district courts and affirm substantial upward
and downward variances.
The Sixth Circuit's reaction was mixed compared to the Tenth's.
It strongly endorsed Gall, announcing that it would "no longer apply
... proportionality review" and that it considers its cases applying
the review, including Davis, "effectively overturned."'19 Still, some
Sixth Circuit panels may be trying to rebuild proportionality review.
The court has held that the "essentials" of its pre-Gall substantive
reasonableness review are consistent with the requirements of
Gall."' This pre-Gall substantive reasonableness review asked
whether a sentence gives "an unreasonable amount of weight to any
pertinent factor"192 -a rootless standard ripe for de novo review or
even a weak proportionality review. Elsewhere, the court observed
that Gall allows the circuits "to require some correlation between
the extent of a variance and the justification for it."'' More recently,
a panel reversed a sentence of probation as substantively unreason-
able because the district court based its sentence on the defendant's
lack of culpability relative to the other defendants in the scheme.'
188. United States v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312, 1314 (10th Cir. 2008).
189. Id. at 1318.
190. When the court directly reconsiders the Davis rule, the "room to distinguish" standard
may survive, as long as it does not require extraordinary circumstances. United States v.
Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[W]e no longer apply a form of proportionality
review to outside-Guidelines sentences, which would require the strength of the justification
for a departure to vary in proportion to the amount of deviation from the Guidelines, and find
our prior cases applying this rule, see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491, 496 (6th Cir.
2006), to have been effectively overturned by Gall.").
191. United States v. Vowell, 516 F.3d 503, 510 (6th Cir. 2008).
192. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
193. United States v. Grossman, 513 F.3d 592, 596 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Gall v. United
States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594-95 (2007)).
194. United States v. Hunt, 521 F.3d 636, 641, 649 (6th Cir. 2008).
298 [Vol. 50:267
DEATH BY A THOUSAND CASES
Although the majority deemed this an "impermissible factor, 195 the
dissent observed ulterior reasons for the reversal. "I am unhappy to
report that we have once again begun the slippery slope of agreeing
with district court's [sic] who depart upward on the basis that they
were reasonable and did not abuse their discretion, but when a
judge decides to sentence below the non-binding guidelines, then we
reverse and remand."'" Even in the largely deferential Sixth
Circuit, proportionality review probably stands.
Other circuits have reacted similarly, preserving proportionality
to the greatest extent possible after Gall.'97 The Fourth Circuit is
the boldest thus far, reading Gall as affirming its proportionality
review.' However, the Fourth Circuit has affirmed a significant
downward variance where the district court sufficiently explained
its sentence according to the § 3553(a) factors.1 99 The Eleventh
Circuit confined Gall to its narrow prohibitions and focused on
the decision's language allowing circuit courts to consider the extent
of variances from the Guidelines range. 00 The Second Circuit
employed this language to reverse a below-Guidelines sentence as
substantively unreasonable.20 ' Citing these reversals by the
Eleventh and Second Circuits, one circuit judge praised them for
"re-weighing... the facts in the context of § 3553(a)."° 2 While district
courts are in the best position to weigh the facts, he said,
195. Id. at 649.
196. Id. at 654 (Martin, J., dissenting).
197. See United States v. Lehmann, 513 F.3d 805,808 (8th Cir. 2008) ("[A]s we understand
Gall, we now examine the 'substantive reasonableness of the sentence' by taking into account
'the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines
range' ..... (quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 598)).
198. Citing a pre-Gall decision in which it held that the "farther the court diverges from
the advisory guideline range, the more compelling the reasons for the divergence must be,"
United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006), the Fourth Circuit said, "This
statement is consistent with Gall's requirement that, if the district court 'decides that an
outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, [it] must consider the extent of the deviation and
ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance."'
United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 475 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 590-91).
199. United States v. Smith, No. 06-4885, 2008 WL 1816564, at *3 (4th Cir. Apr. 23, 2008)
('While we cannot say we would have varied [the defendant's] sentence to 24 months
imprisonment [from the Guidelines range of 78 to 97 months], we also cannot say that the
district court abused its discretion in so doing.").
200. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008).
201. United States v. Cutler, 520 F.3d 136, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2008).
202. United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 169 (4th Cir. 2008) (Gregory, J., concurring).
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I can see no way, as a practical matter, to review the substantive
reasonableness of a sentence without assessing the district
court's rationale for the sentence and reviewing its application
of the facts to the guidelines and § 3553(a). Even if a district
court reviews each of the § 3553(a) factors individually, its
sentence is not inevitably reasonable. To conclude otherwise
would make appellate review, in effect, a nullity.2
°3
The judge also noted the confusion arising from the Supreme
Court's post-Booker jurisprudence. "While I have closely studied the
post-Booker Supreme Court triumverate of Rita, Kimbrough v.
United States, and Gall, I must conclude that the Court has left the
specifics of how appellate courts are to conduct substantive reason-
ableness review, charitably speaking, unclear.""2 4 Given how quickly
some appellate courts have taken advantage of Gall's contradictory
language, the Court's holding clearly failed to prohibit proportional-
ity review. Proportionality review continues to prevent truly
advisory Guidelines, and judge-found facts still are legally necessary
for some sentences.
IV. LESS-THAN-ADVISORY GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT
Post-Booker appellate review has effectively allowed the manda-
tory Guidelines to continue in some circuits. Besides the pre- and
post-Booker statistics already noted, °5 anecdotal evidence demon-
strates the striking similarities between the effects of manda-
tory and "advisory" Guidelines. Consider again the case of Paul
Sedore.2 °6 The sentence based on the facts that the jury found
beyond a reasonable doubt was a mere fraction of the eventual
sentence, based on judge-found facts. The most significant difference
between Paul Sedore's case and Freddie Booker's is that while
judge-found facts approximately doubled Booker's sentence, they
quintupled Sedore's. °7
203. Id.
204. Id. at 168.
205. See supra note 73.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
207. For the facts of Freddie Booker's sentence, see supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
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To argue that judge-found facts were not absolutely necessary to
Sedore's sentence is to miss the big picture. Without the additional
fact-finding, it is highly unlikely that the district judge would have
given Sedore a sentence 500 percent higher than the Guidelines
range. True, the district judge could have attempted to deviate so
drastically from the Guidelines without the additional facts. If he
did, a strong possibility existed that the Sixth Circuit would have
reversed the sentence as unreasonable. In other more Guidelines-
centric circuits, such as the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh, the
chances for reversal would be much greater. District judges have
many incentives to sentence within the Guidelines: fewer issues to
consider in crafting a sentence, a simpler and quicker sentencing
hearing, an even more succinct explanation, and a presumptively
reasonable sentence."' Proportionality review and its threat of
reversal supply the disincentive for judges not to sentence outside
the Guidelines. Like thousands of other judges sentencing defen-
dants in the federal courts each year, Paul Sedore's judge was not
entirely free to sentence outside the Guidelines.
The essential element of the "advisory" Guidelines' constitutional
violation is proportionality review. If the circuits only favored
within-Guidelines sentences through the presumption of reasonable-
ness and disparate sentencing explanations, reasonableness review
would not violate the Sixth Amendment. While such a system may
create concern that district courts would rarely sentence outside the
Guidelines, at least they would have the freedom to do so. But when
the circuits combine the presumption of reasonableness with
proportionality review, the Guidelines are not only easier, but safer.
Proportionality review eliminates the complete freedom to sentence
outside the Guidelines.
Because of the threat of proportionality review, judge-found facts
are legally necessary to a defendant's increased sentence.2 9 This
regime does not violate the Sixth Amendment, according to Rita,
208. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2488 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) ('What
works on appeal determines what works at trial ....").
209. See Mullen & Davis, supra note 60, at 641 ("A judge must still use facts not found by
a jury to enhance a sentence beyond what he would be able to impose based on the jury
verdict alone, and he has no discretion to go outside of the enhanced range, except with a
further finding of fact."); McConnell, supra note 33, at 678 ("All the things that troubled Sixth
Amendment purists about the pre-Booker Guidelines system are unchanged.").
2008]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
because the judge retains discretion to determine the ultimate
sentence. That argument is valid if, and only if, the Guidelines are
truly advisory. As this Note has demonstrated, however, the
Guidelines are not merely advisory. Circuits will uphold some
sentences "as reasonable only because of the existence of judge-
found facts."'2 10
Not only does reasonableness review often deprive defendants of
their Sixth Amendment jury right, but it may deprive them of just
sentences. As Judge Sutton put it, "no one sentences transcripts.""21
Compared with appellate judges, district judges are more familiar
with defendants and the circumstances of their crimes. When a
defendant does not receive the sentence he deserves, whether more
or less lenient, justice is not served. District judges are not infalli-
ble. In most situations, however, the sentencing court is better
positioned than the circuit court to see the subtle signs of rehabilita-
tion, a callous criminality, or remorse, and tailor a just sentence
accordingly.
V. THE SOLUTION: END SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS REVIEW
AND REQUIRE UNIFORM SENTENCING EXPLANATIONS
The Supreme Court can either tolerate an unconstitutional
system of its own creation for the sake of consistency, or it can
recognize Booker's mistake and impose a new, constitutional
solution. The Court is reluctant to reshape drastically the entire
sentencing regime and require the jury to find each fact for sentenc-
ing purposes. And rightly so-that is Congress's job. "12 Nonetheless,
a constitutional solution is within the Court's range of action. For
the following reasons, the Supreme Court should prohibit substan-
tive reasonableness review and require a uniform procedural
review.
210. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2478 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211. United States v. Poynter, 495 F.3d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 2007) ("While trial judges
sentence individuals face to face for a living, we review transcripts for a living. No one
sentences transcripts.").
212. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2488 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("At this point, only Congress can
make good on both its enacted policy of mandatory Guidelines sentencing and the guarantee
of a robust right of jury trial."); Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 603 (2007) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the best solution is for Congress to reinstate the mandatory
Guidelines and require the jury to find all facts necessary for increased sentences).
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A. Prohibit Substantive Reasonableness Review
The best way to render the Guidelines advisory is to eliminate the
tools that appellate courts use to enforce them. Prohibiting substan-
tive reasonableness review would eliminate both the presumption
of reasonableness and proportionality review. As Justice Scalia
wrote in Rita, "The only way to assure district courts that they can
deviate from the advisory Guidelines, and to ensure that judge-
found facts are never legally essential to the sentence, is to prohibit
appellate courts from reviewing the substantive sentencing choices
made by district courts." '213 Substantive review is the real barrier to
truly advisory Guidelines with individualized, constitutional
sentencing.
Some have argued that eliminating substantive review altogether
is unnecessarily radical. Because proportionality review is the
essential element to the unconstitutionality of federal sentencing,
one might argue, prohibiting proportionality review would grant
district courts the freedom to sentence outside the Guidelines.
For example, Justice Souter has proposed a uniform standard of
substantive unreasonableness.214 A uniform substantive review
would greatly improve the current regime, if appellate courts could
apply it faithfully. Unfortunately, however, even a uniform review
will not make the "entire sentencing range set by statute available
to" the district judges.215 If the Court completely prohibits propor-
tionality review, the circuit courts will search for some other means
of assessing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence. The
circuits have amply demonstrated that they are disposed to affirm
within-Guidelines sentences and scrutinize outside-Guidelines
sentences. In many cases, the circuits treat the Guidelines as
mandatory. They implement uneven reasonableness review through
substantive review.
The author of the Sixth Circuit's Davis rule, Judge Jeffrey S.
Sutton, advocates limiting substantive review to extreme sen-
tences. 216 Sutton discourages substantive review of modest variances
213. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2478 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 2488 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 2478 n.3.
216. Jeffrey S. Sutton, An Appellate Perspective on Federal Sentencing After Booker and
Rita, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 83-84 (2007). Sutton sees "little room for appellate review" of
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from the Guidelines because "appellate courts are poorly positioned
to reassess the application of these factors from a distance."217 In
order for sentences at the extremes to remain somewhat consistent,
however, Sutton advocates substantive reasonableness review.21 At
the extremes, appellate courts can better draw "reasoned distinc-
tions" between sentences, and they "should not hesitate" to use
substantive review to promote consistency.219
Sutton's proposal ultimately fails for two reasons. First, it is a
vague standard. The line between "modest" and "extreme" variances
is very difficult to draw. Certainly Davis's 99.89 percent downward
variance was extreme.22 ° But what about 90 percent? eighty
percent? Sutton eschews using percentages,221 but a line is neces-
sary to guide circuit courts. Further, as Sutton himself observed in
Davis and his article, the sentencing court has a unique perspective
of the defendant and the appropriate sentence. 2 2 Maybe Davis's low
sentence was warranted. If "no one sentences transcripts," then how
can a circuit court confidently recognize extraordinary circum-
stances? The need to distinguish with future, more deserving
defendants is an attractive argument for the Davis rule.2 23 Yet, that
argument provides little guidance for district courts and a fuzzy
standard for the appellate courts. Hypothetically, there will always
be a more deserving defendant. A court cannot anticipate infinity.
More problematically, Sutton's proposal does not solve the
constitutional defects of substantive review, an issue that he does
not address in his article. Under his proposal, extreme downward or
upward variances are unreasonable unless the judge finds certain
mitigating or aggravating facts to distinguish the present case from
district courts' applications of the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 84.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 85-86 ("[S]o long as appellate courts ensure that the trial courts meaningfully
communicate why a guidelines sentence does not make sense in a given case and so long as
they ensure that trial courts comply with the procedural requirements of post-Booker
sentencing, I see little room for substantive-reasonableness review of such sentences.").
219. Id.
220. See United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 2006).
221. Sutton, supra note 216, at 85. Another shortcoming of using percentages is that most
courts regard probation as a 100 percent variance, even though probation entails a
"substantial restriction of freedom." Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 595 (2007).
222. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 166-69.
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future ones." 4 Some judges will react by sentencing closer to the
Guidelines range. Others will find the facts necessary for the
Guidelines to encompass the sentence they wish to issue, "in
disparagement of the jury right."'225 As Justice Scalia points out, it
is difficult to see how this "chaos" improves upon the mandatory
regime.226 Regardless of the circumstances in which the circuits use
substantive review, across all sentences or only at the extremes, it
drives sentences toward the Guidelines, inevitably violating the jury
right for some defendants.
No matter its form, substantive review is inherently subjective.
If circuit judges inquire into whether a sentence gives an unreason-
able amount of weight to any one factor, or if it reflects the gravity
of the crime, they must weigh these factors themselves. Substantive
review "pressure[s] district courts into either crafting sentences
within the Guidelines range or, at a minimum, categorically
ignoring substantial upward or downward variances. ' As long as
circuit courts review for substantive reasonableness, they will
unevenly apply that standard.
The uneven application will continue to produce unconstitutional
sentences. District judges will recognize the risk of reversal of
sentencing outside the Guidelines, and will tend to sentence within
the Guidelines. If a judge wishes to increase a sentence, he will still
do so by finding the facts necessary to move the Guidelines range in
line with that sentence.
Alternatively, one might argue that while eliminating substantive
review is the solution, the Court should incrementally reach this
goal. Perhaps it is better to help the sentencing system gradually
improve, rather than advance another failed drastic solution, as
Booker fashioned. The current approach, though, shows no signs of
improvement. The pattern thus far is that the Court considers a
feature of reasonableness review, sets out to restrict it, but instead
barely restricts and mostly condones the feature. Afterward, the
confusion and ambiguity leave the federal courts in a worse state
than the Court found them. The Court would be better off not
224. See Sutton, supra note 216, at 85-90.
225. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2488 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 2480 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. United States v. Tomko, 498 F.3d 157, 184 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J., dissenting).
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altering reasonableness review in piecemeal fashion until it decides
how to clean up its own mess.
Gradual improvement is also unlikely because the federal
sentencing institution is highly resistant to the advisory Guidelines.
Probation officers draft presentence reports much as they did before
Booker.228 Prosecutors and defendants still focus their sentencing
haggling on the proper Guidelines calculation.229 The Department
of Justice requires federal prosecutors to request the Guidelines
sentence in all but extraordinary cases,3 ° and the U.S. Attorneys
Office instructs them to argue that the within-Guidelines sentence
"necessarily furthers several of the goals of sentencing specified in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).,,231 Moreover, the sentencing statute still
reflects the mandatory regime for which it was written. Booker only
excised the mandatory provision and the appellate standard of
review, and added the vague "unreasonableness" review. Therefore,
the only substantive guide for the appellate and district courts
is § 3553(a). Those factors, however, "were not designed as an
appellate standard of review and, in reality, provide no practical
guidance. The § 3553(a) factors tell judges ... not to sentence too
high and not to sentence too low." '232 If the Guidelines were truly
advisory, § 3553(a)'s vagueness would give district courts more
discretion. But if the circuit courts are so inclined, they can fill that
vagueness with their judgments and enforce close adherence to the
Guidelines.
A thunderclap from above is required to shock the federal
sentencing regime into finally treating the Guidelines as advisory.
The boom must come from the Supreme Court and the change
must begin with the appellate courts. If the appellate courts stop
enforcing the Guidelines, then the district courts will likely sentence
228. See Gertner, supra note 155, at 70-71; Berman, supra note 12, at 21-22.
229. Gertner, supra note 155, at 70-71; Berman, supra note 12, at 21-22.
230. See Memorandum from James B. Comey, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice 2
(Jan. 28, 2005), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/
ffles/dag-jan_28_comey-memo-on-booker.pdf C'[F]ederal prosecutors must obtain supervisory
authorization to recommend or stipulate to a sentence outside the appropriate Guidelines
range ..... ),
231. Elizabeth A. Olson, The Presumption of Reasonableness for Within-Guidelines
Sentences, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS BULLETIN, Sept. 2006, at 30.
232. United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1175 (10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J.,
concurring); see also United States v. Gammicchia, 498 F.3d 467, 468-69 (7th Cir. 2007)
(calling § 3553(a) "vague and nondirectional").
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according to § 3553(a) and require the probation office, the prosecu-
tors, and the defense bar to do the same.
Purely procedural review would sacrifice some sentencing
consistency. But even if purely procedural review abandons sub-
stantive review's consistency, it would reduce some disparities.
Appellate courts would still reverse sentences based on impermissi-
ble factors, that failed to consider § 3553(a), or failed to explain their
reasons,233 necessarily eliminating some errant sentences. Because
the Sentencing Commission revises the Guidelines "to reflect the
desirable sentencing practices," over time the "district courts will
have less reason to depart from the Commission's recommendations,
leading to more sentencing uniformity.234
Finally, one might argue that prohibiting substantive review is
not prudent because the current system only occasionally violates
the Sixth Amendment. Indeed, it would be one thing if these
violations occurred in spite of an otherwise constitutional appellate
review. But these violations occur because of substantive reason-
ableness review. Further, as Justice Scalia observed in Rita, the
presence of constitutional violations "in only a small proportion of
cases" was sufficient for the Court to overturn the mandatory
Guidelines.235 Surely such violations justify tweaking an appellate
standard of review if they justified the much larger change of
rendering the Guidelines advisory.2" 6
The current federal sentencing regime so consistently violates
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial that the Court is obliged
to solve it. Admittedly, the Court held this substantive review
constitutional in Rita and Gall. Nonetheless, the Court has ac-
knowledged the infirmities of the advisory Guidelines by frequently
reconsidering the Booker solution. The Court will likely continue to
revisit Booker given the internal inconsistencies of that decision and
those of Rita and Gall. As the circuits' reactions to Rita and Gall
have demonstrated, they will continue to supplant the district
233. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2006) ('CThe court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open
court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence ....").
234. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2483 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 2480.
236. Id. ("If our conjured-up system does not accomplish [Booker's] goal [of eliminating
constitutional violations entirely], then by what right have we supplanted the congressionally
enacted mandatory Guidelines?").
2008] 307
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
courts' judgment with their own judgment, unless and until the
Court sets well-defined, constitutional boundaries. Even if the
Supreme Court does not immediately overturn Rita and Gall, it will
likely tweak its instructions to the circuit courts in order to fix the
obvious defects in the decisions. These defects, and the circuits'
tendency to enforce the Guidelines, will eventually force the Court
to revise drastically its Booker solution. Rather than allow Booker's
uncertainty and constitutional violations to persist, the Court
should recognize its failure sooner rather than later. Because
substantive review is inherently subjective and the circuits are so
intent on enforcing the Guidelines, prohibiting substantive review
is necessary for a return to constitutional sentencing.
B. Uniform Procedural Review
A uniform procedural review would force district courts to
consider all the § 3553(a) factors and not heavily favor the Guide-
lines. The appellate courts should require an adequate explanation
of sentencing reasons from the district courts for sentences within
or outside the Guidelines. Although not necessary for constitutional
sentencing, this solution would clarify that the Guidelines are not
the default, but one factor among many that judges must consider
according to § 3553(a). Requiring the same specificity would allow
"meaningful appellate review" of all sentences, and not just outside-
Guidelines sentences.2 37 Currently, the relaxed within-Guidelines
explanation requirement creates the temptation to sentence only
within the Guidelines and to rely on judge-found facts. Equalizing
the explanation requirement eliminates this temptation-the last
aspect of the Guidelines' "gravitational pull."
This solution may require a slight statutory alteration. Without
Congress, the Supreme Court can clarify that the circuits must still
comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1), which requires the court to state
its reason for a within-Guidelines sentence. However, because
§ 3553(c)(2) requires a "specific reason" for outside-Guidelines
sentences instead of only a "reason," the Court alone cannot fix this
uneven requirement. Congress should amend § 3553(c) to require
237. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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uniform explanations. These changes would eliminate the district
courts' incentive to sentence within the Guidelines.
These changes would also avoid the injustices of the current
system. Those judges best positioned to tailor a just sentence to the
defendant and his crime-the district court judges-would have full
discretion to do so, provided that they follow the correct procedures.
This regime would better comply with § 3553(a) and its plain
discretionary language, as well as Booker's core holding that the
Guidelines are advisory.
CONCLUSION
Because Booker failed to guide appellate courts in their reason-
ableness review, the circuit courts have filled the gap. When
exercised, substantive review allows circuit courts to strip district
courts of their discretion to sentence outside the Guidelines range.
Uneven procedural review violates 18 U.S.C. § 3553, allows the
district courts to treat the Guidelines as the default, and enhances
the "gravitational pull" of the Guidelines. Reasonableness review
often results in the judge, not the jury, finding facts legally neces-
sary for a sentence, violating the defendant's constitutional jury
right under the Sixth Amendment.
Until Congress cures the multiple defects in the system, the
Supreme Court should correct its own failure and prohibit circuits
from reviewing sentences for substantive reasonableness, and
require uniform procedural review. While an imperfect solution, it
makes the best of a bad situation. Most importantly, sentencing will
be constitutional, and in the hands of those best positioned to issue
a just sentence: the district courts.
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